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Abstract
Consider a series system consisting of sockets into each of which a component is
inserted: if a component fails, it is replaced with a new identical one immediately
and system operation resumes. An interesting question is: how to model the failure
process of the system as a whole when the lifetime distribution of each component
is unknown? This paper attempts to answer this question by developing two new
models, for the cases of a known specified and an unknown unspecified number
of sockets, respectively. It introduces the concept of a virtual component, and in
this sense, we suppose that the effect of repair corresponds to replacement of the
most reliable component in the system. It then discusses the probabilistic properties
of the models and methods for parameter estimation. Based on six datasets of
artificially generated system failures and a real-world dataset, the paper compares
the performance of the proposed models with four other commonly used models:
the renewal process, the geometric process, Kijima’s generalised renewal process,
and the power law process. The results show that the proposed models outperform
these comparators on the datasets, based on the Akaike information criterion.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Modelling the failure processes of technical systems has attracted much attention from re-
liability researchers. There exist many papers that attempt to develop statistical models for
characterising the failure process of a system (see, Duane, 1964; Cox & Lewis, 1966; Lam, 1988;
Kijima & Sumita, 1986; Baxter, Kijima, & Tortorella, 1996; Dorado, Hollander, & Sethuraman,
1997; Doyen & Gaudoin, 2004; Wu & Zuo, 2010; Doyen & Gaudoin, 2011, for example). How-
ever, much of this existing research assumes that the systems are equivalent to one-component
systems. Such an assumption is restrictive and unrealistic as real-world systems normally con-
sist of very many components. In addition, in the real world, the lifetime distribution of each
component may not be estimable for various reasons; for example, data on real systems often
contain little or no information about the failure processes of individual components. Hence,
there is a need to develop new, simple (few parameters) and elegant (richly applicable) failure
process models for multi-component systems. This is the purpose of this paper.
Before we introduce our models, we define repair concepts, and two important models of
imperfect repair.
1.2 Definitions
In reliability mathematics, the effect of maintenance upon failure of an item is typically
categorised into:
• Perfect repair, in which maintenance restores the condition of a failed item to an “as good
as new” status; for example, a failed item is replaced with a new identical one. The renewal
process is a widely used model for the failure process of items under perfect repair (Ross,
1996).
• Minimal repair (see, Duane, 1964; Cox & Lewis, 1966, for example), in which maintenance
restores a failed item to its state immediately prior to failure. The operating state of an
item after minimal repair is often called “as bad as old” in the literature. The only model of
minimal repair available in the literature is the non-homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP).
• Imperfect repair, in which maintenance restores a failed item to a status somewhere between
“as good as new” and “as bad as old”. Many models, including the geometric process (GP)
and its variants (Lam, 1988; Wang & Pham, 1996; Wu & Clements-Croome, 2006), the
generalised renewal process models (GRP) (Kijima & Sumita, 1986; Kijima, 1989; Doyen &
Gaudoin, 2004), and the reduction of failure hazard models (Doyen & Gaudoin, 2004), have
been developed for modelling imperfect repair.
2
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The particular models themselves are defined as follows.
• The geometric process: Following Lam (1988), given a sequence of non-negative random vari-
ables {Xk, k = 1, 2, . . . }, if they are independent and the cumulative distribution func-
tion of Xk is given by F (a
k−1x) for k = 1, 2, . . . , where a is a positive constant, then
{Xk, k = 1, 2, · · · } is called a geometric process (GP). The GP has attracted a lot of at-
tention in the literature (see, Zhang, Gaudoin, & Xie, 2015; Wu & Scarf, 2015, for example).
• The generalised renewal process: Kijima and Sumita (1986) and Kijima (1989) introduce two
types of repair models, type I and type II, using the concept of virtual age. These models
distinguish between the age of the system, which is the time elapsed since the system was
new (usually at time t = 0), and the virtual age of the system, which accounts for the
current health of the system when compared to a new system. The two models assume
Vk = Vk−1 + qkXk, and Vk = qk(Vk−1 +Xk), respectively, where Vk is the virtual age of the
system immediately after the kth repair, Xk is the operating time of the system since the
kth repair, and 0 ≤ qk ≤ 1. The models are often referred to collectively as the generalised
renewal process (GRP). In the type I model, if qk = 0, then the kth repair is a perfect repair;
if qk = 1, then the kth repair is a minimal repair.
• The renewal process, the superimposed renewal process, and the homogeneous Poisson process
(HPP): Consider a series system consisting of m sockets into each of which there are inserted
non-repairable independent components, and whenever a component fails, the system fails,
and the failed component is replaced with a new identical one and system operation resumes.
Then the number of failures occurring at each socket is a renewal process and the number
of failures of the series system as a whole forms a superimposed renewal process (Høyland &
Rausand, 2009). In general, the superimposed renewal process is not a renewal process, unless
the individual renewal processes are homogeneous Poisson processes (Drenick, 1960). When
both the number of components in the system is large and the operation time of the system
is large then the superimposed renewal process behaves approximately as a homogeneous
Poisson process (HPP) (Høyland & Rausand, 2009). The HPP is a counting process with
constant intensity function (or rate of occurrence of failures).
• The non-homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP): This process generalizes the HPP and has
a time-varying intensity function.
1.3 Motivation for our models
The failure process models such as the GRP (Gilardoni, Toledo, Freitas, & Colosimo, 2015),
GP (Wu & Clements-Croome, 2006) and NHPP (Asfaw & Lindqvist, 2015) do not distinguish
the effect of maintenance upon failure of different components in the system. Thus, such models
effectively consider the system as a one-component system. The use of these models is typically
3
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justified by the fact that in practice failure data are scarce, and so, even if one could model
each component in the system individually and plan maintenance accordingly, such an approach
would not be applicable.
Furthermore, appealing to the asymptotic behaviour of the superimposed renewal process as
justification for the use of an HPP in an application is questionable because in practice typical
systems are relatively young and failures are rare. Using an NHPP with an increasing intensity
function such as the power-law process (Høyland & Rausand, 2009) overcomes this system age
issue. However, the NHPP (and HPP for that matter) supposes repair is minimal. At the other
end of the spectrum, the renewal process supposes the entire system is replaced on failure so
that repair is perfect.
Capturing imperfect repair with the GP or the GRP presents further difficulties. The GP
implicitly assumes that the times between failures are either stochastically increasing or stochas-
tically decreasing, which is not always true for the failure process of a series system. For example,
if all the components in the series system have increasing hazard functions, then a replacement
of a failed component improves the reliability of the system; on the other hand, operating
times between adjacent replacements of the system are stochastically decreasing. Hence the
times between failures of the system may be neither stochastically increasing nor stochastically
decreasing. Furthermore, in the limit (large number components at large t) the superimposed
renewal process behaves as a homogeneous Poisson process, which cannot be captured by the
GP.
The GRP overcomes the issue of stochastically increasing or decreasing times between failures
by allowing the repair effect parameter to vary. However, if indeed qk vary with k, then typically
they must be estimated using a very limited number of failure observations. As a result, the
models will be poorly estimated. If the qk are assumed equal for all k, then the GRP will
not capture the fact that the effects of replacement of failed components of different types are
different.
1.4 Our proposed solution
In summary then, the existing models of the failure process of a multi-component system are
restrictive. Furthermore, limited failure data make it impossible to estimate either the lifetime
distribution of each component in a system or a model for a system as a whole with many
parameters. We must therefore seek simple and elegant models for a system as a whole that
can be fitted using a limited number of failure observations. Our contribution develops two new
classes of such models for a series system with non-identical components.
In these models, the failure process of the system is regarded as equivalent to the failure
process of a system consisting of a component, called the virtual component, in its socket and
4
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the remainder of the system, called the virtual sub-system (VSS). Upon a failure of the system,
we suppose that the virtual component is replaced and the remainder of the system is either
not maintained or equivalently minimally repaired. the remainder of the system is either not
maintained (equivalently minimally repaired) or subject to imperfect repair. In reality, one can
contend that at a repair, the change in system reliability is at least as big as if the most reliable
component had been replaced. Broadly speaking, replacement of the virtual component upon
system failure captures this notion.
It should be noted then that in this paper, we distinguish three systems: i) the real system,
that is, the reality, e.g. a manufacturing cell, a traction motor, a wind turbine, a compressor; ii)
the system, that is, the mathematical model of the system, e.g. a series system with a number
of non-repairable, non-identical components; and iii) the virtual system (VS), consisting of a
virtual component (VC) and a virtual sub-system (VSS).
In our first model (Model I) the number of sockets in the series system is not specified. In our
second (Model II) the number of sockets in the series system is m. The distinguishing features
of the two models are discussed in detail later in the paper. The key concept, and a contribution
of this paper, is the notion of the virtual component. Through this notion, our models capture
not only that a repair effect is neither as good as new nor as bad as old but also that systems
comprise distinct, typically non-identical components.
The paper considers the scenarios where the lifetime distribution of each component is neither
known nor knowable for various reasons. For example, if the number of system failures is large
but one does not know the causes of system failure (so that the different components cannot be
distinguished), the lifetime distribution for each component cannot be estimated. On the other
hand, if the number of failures is small, knowing the causes of system failures does not provide
sufficient information to estimate the lifetime distribution for each component.
Thus, we claim that this paper is the first paper to model the repair effect in multi-component
systems with a stochastic process, on the basis that the virtual age reduction models, such as the
GRP, do not model a multi-component system, and the superimposed renewal process, HPP and
NHPP do not model repair. It proposes elegant models for the failure process of a series system
that overcome the limitations of existing models that are either restrictive (renewal process
and its generalizations) or require knowledge of the failure process for individual components
(superimposed renewal process).
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 lists assumptions and notation required.
Section 3 develops the two models of interest. Section 4 gives the likelihood functions of the
two models given data on failures. Section 5 assesses the validity of the proposed models based
on artificially generated datasets and a real-world dataset. We make some concluding remarks,
including the implications of our work for applications, in the final section.
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2 Assumptions and notation
Consider a series system with a number of statistically independent components. If a compo-
nent fails, the system fails. On failure, the failed component is replaced instantaneously by an
identical component, and the system is restored to operation. Time for replacement is negligi-
ble. Associate a socket with each component location in the system, in the sense of Ascher and
Feingold (1984), so that the components in their sockets collectively perform the operational
function of the system.
The system is new and functioning at time t = 0.
Denote system failures occurring at successive time points by Tk, for k = 1, 2, . . . , with
T1 < T2 < . . . . Let X1 = T1 and Xk = Tk − Tk−1 for k ≥ 2. Then, X1 is the time to the first
failure and Xk is the time between the (k − 1)th and the kth failures (for all k ≥ 2). Let t
denote an arbitrary time since new, so that if Tk < t < Tk + 1 then by time t the system has
experienced exactly k failures. Further, we denote tk as the observation of Tk.
The hazard function of a component with lifetime X is
h(t) = lim
∆t→0
P{t ≤ X < t+∆t|t ≤ X}
∆t
. (1)
Let N(t) denote the number of failures of the system up to time t. The failure process of
the system can be defined equivalently by the random processes {Xk}k≥1 or {N(t)}t≥0 and is
characterised by the intensity function,
λ(t) = lim
∆t→0
P{N(t+∆t)−N(t) ≥ 1|H (t)}
∆t
, (2)
where P{N(t+∆t)−N(t) ≥ 1|H (t)} is the probability that the system fails within the interval
(t, t+∆t), given the history of failures up to time t, H (t) (Cox & Lewis, 1966).
Note: when a counting process counts failures of a (non-repairable) component with a lifetime
X , since this component can fail at most once, the intensity function of this counting process
is the same as the hazard function (of the component). Therefore, for a (non-repairable) com-
ponent the terms hazard and intensity are synonymous. However, for clarity, throughout this
paper, where we are concerned with a component, we will use the term hazard function, and
where we are concerned with the system, we will (necessarily) use the term intensity function.
Their integrals
∫ t
0 λ(u)du and
∫ t
0 h(u)du are referred to as the cumulative intensity function
(CIF) and the cumulative hazard function (CHF), respectively. Throughout the paper, h(x) is
a hazard function and λ(x) is an intensity function.
6
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3 Model development
In this section we will develop the two new models. First, we recall two concepts, and then
we derive a result about the cumulative intensity function of the system when the components
in a series system are identical (Proposition 1).
Given a component with hazard function h(t) and lifetime X , then
Pr{X ≤ y + x|X ≥ y} =
F (x+ y)− F (y)
1− F (y)
= 1− exp
(
−
∫ x+y
y
h(u)du
)
. (3)
Pr{X ≤ y + x|X ≥ y} in Eq. (3) is the cumulative distribution function of the remaining
lifetime distribution of a component that has survived for y time units. It implies that the
residual CHF of a component that has survived for y time units is
∫ x+y
y h(u). Similarly, for
a repairable system with intensity function λs(u),
∫ t
x λs(u)du is the cumulative intensity over
the interval [x, t) regardless of the history of failures of the system. For the sake of distinction,∫ t
x λs(u)du is referred to as the cumulative residual intensity function (CRIF) when x 6= 0.
Here, with the assumption that an item is subject to minimal repair, the CIF
∫ t
0 λs(u)du is the
expected number of failures of this item in [0, t), whereas the CRIF
∫ t
x λs(u)du is the expected
number of failures in the time interval (x, t).
Note, for a series system consisting of m components, each of which has hazard function hi(t)
(for i = 1, 2, ..., m), then the intensity function of the system prior to first failure is
∑m
i=1 hi(t).
Proposition 1 Consider a series system with m identical and statistically independent com-
ponents. If a component fails, it is replaced with a new identical one immediately and system
operation resumes. Let h0(t) denote the hazard function of a component and H0(t) =
∫ t
0 h0(x)dx
be the corresponding CHF. Then, for t < t1, the CIF of the system before the first failure is
mH0(t). Between the kth and (k + 1)th failures of the system (k = 1, 2, . . . ), that is, after tk
time units, the CRIF is given by
H0(t− tk) + Φk(t) + Ψk(t), (4)
where
Φk(t) =


0 if k ≥ m,
(m− k)
∫ t
tk
h0(x)dx if 1 ≤ k ≤ m− 1,
Ψ1(t) = 0
and Ψk(t) is a function of t, t1, t2, . . . , and tk for k ≥ 2
Proof.
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(a) Since a failed component is replaced with a new identical component, at time t between
the kth and (k+ 1)th failure of the system (tk < t < tk +1), the CHF of the most recently
installed component of the system is
∫ t−tk
0 h0(x)dx.
(b) When 1 ≤ k ≤ m − 1, at time tk < t < tk + 1, in addition to the component discussed
in (a), k − 1 components have been replaced. Therefore, at least m − k components have
never been replaced and have been operating since t = 0. The CRIF of the subsystem of
these m− k components is (m− k)
∫ t
tk
h0(x)dx. Ψk(t) is the CRIF of the subsystem of the
other k − 1 components.
(c) When k ≥ m, following the kth repair the most recently replaced component has CHF∫ t−tk
0 h0(x)dx. Further, the existence of a set of components that have never failed cannot
be established, therefore the CRIF of the system can only be partitioned into the two terms∫ t−tk
0 h0(x)dx and Ψk(t).
(d) The CRIF of the series system is then the sum of the three terms H0(t− tk)+Φk(t)+Ψk(t).
This is because: the term H0(t− tk) is the CRIF derived in (a); the term Φk(t) is the CRIF
derived in (b) that has excluded the renewed component in (a); and the last term Ψk(t)
is a residual term that equals to Hk(t− tk)−H0(t− tk)− Φk(t), where Hk(t− tk) is the
CRIF of the system between the kth and (k + 1)th failures of the system, and is unknown.
Note the introduction of the remainder term Ψk(t) is just a notational convenience. It
is the form of first two terms that are important. Additivity holds because components
are independent so that the counting process of system failure is the sum of the counting
processes of component failures.
Alternatively, one can understand the summation in Eq. (4) as: the CRIF of the most
recently replaced component is H0(t− tk) and that of a subset of the never replaced com-
ponents is Φk(t) + Ψk(t). 
Note, the cumulative intensity function (CIF) of the system (from time 0) can be obtained
by summing the CRIF over each of intervals between failure/repair.
The idea of Proposition 1 is that the CRIF of a series system can be partitioned into a known
term mH0(t) for the time before the first system failure, or a known term H0(t − tk) + Φk(t)
for the time after the first system failure, and an unknown term Ψk(t), where Φk(t) might
be modelled with the CRIF of a convenient counting process, such as a homogeneous Poisson
process (HPP) or non-homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP).
Proposition 1 inspires us to develop two models (in the following subsections) for series
systems with non-identical components that are useful when data about system failures (in data
collected for the system) is insufficient to estimate the lifetime distribution for each component
of a system. The main idea of the two models, which we call Model I and Model II, is to
represent a series system with a virtual series system. The virtual series system in Model I is
8
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composed of two virtual components (VCs): VC1 and VC2, and the virtual series system in
Model II is composed of a VC and a virtual sub-system (VSS).
Remark 1 The VC1 in Model I and the VC in Model II is replaced with an identical virtual
component (VC) upon failure of the system. The justification for this idea is as follows. For
a series system with components with hazard functions hi(t) (i = 1, 2, ...m), if a component
fails at tk and is replaced with a new identical one, then the contribution this new component
makes at time tk < t < tk+1 to the CRIF of the system is
∫ t−tk
0 hi(x)dx. Furthermore, although
the components that fail at time points tk (k = 1, 2, ...) may be different and are unknown,
the component that failed at tk has a hazard function at least as big as hc(t) = inf
1≤i≤m
hi(t),
and we associate this infimum hazard function hc(t) with the virtual component. For example,
consider a series system with three components with hazard functions 0.4t, 0.45t, and 0.5t,
respectively. At τ time units following the most recent replacement, the CRIF of the system
will have a contribution that is either
∫ τ
0 0.4udu or
∫ τ
0 0.45udu =
∫ τ
0 0.4udu +
∫ τ
0 0.05udu or∫ τ
0 0.5udu =
∫ τ
0 0.4udu +
∫ τ
0 0.1udu, and the common contribution
∫ τ
0 0.4udu is the cumulative
hazard function of the virtual component. That is, the change in system reliability at each
replacement is at least as big as if the most reliable component had been replaced.
In Model I, virtual component 2 (VC2) represents the remainder of the system, and in Model
II the virtual sub-system (VSS) represents the remainder of the system, and at the k-th system
repair VC2 and VSS are respectively not maintained and imperfectly repaired.
3.1 Model I: when the number of components is unknown unspecified
Model I is a counting process with CIF and CRIF defined as follows. For t < t1 (prior to the
first failure) the CIF of the system is
∫ t
0(hc(x) + λs(x))dx, and between the kth and (k + 1)th
failure of the system (k = 1, 2, . . . ) the CRIF is given by
Ω1,k(t) + Ω2,k(t), (5)
where
Ω1,k(t) =
∫ t−tk
0
hc(x)dx
Ω2,k(t) =
∫ t
tk
λs(x)dx,
and hc(x) is the hazard function of VC1. The first term in (5) corresponds to VC1, which is
(virtually) replaced on failure and the second term corresponds to VC2 (the remainder of the
system), on which no maintenance is carried out, so that λs(x) might for example be modelled
with an HPP or alternatively a NHPP with power-law intensity. This model assumes that
9
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
whenever the system fails, VC1 is replaced a new identical VC. We use Figure 1 to illustrate
our idea. Here, VC1 has the CRIF Ω1,k(t) and VC2 has the CRIF Ω2,k(t), and Thus:
• if VC1 fails, a new identical VC will replace it and no maintenance is performed on VC2;
• if VC2 fails, it is minimally repaired and simultaneously VC1 is replaced with a new identical
VC. This means that the VC1 is replaced with a new identical VC whenever it fails or VC2
fails, so that VC1 is renewed upon system failure, regardless of which virtual component
failed.
Fig. 1. The system and its corresponding virtual system in Model I.
3.2 Model II: when the number of components is known specified
Model II is a counting process with CIF and CRIF defined as follows. For t < t1 (prior to the
first failure) the CIF of the system is
∫ t
0(hc(x) + λs(x))dx, and between the kth and (k + 1)th
failure of the system (k = 1, 2, . . . ) the CRIF is given by
Ω1,k(t) + Ω2,k(t), (6)
where
Ω1,k(t) =
∫ t−tk
0
hc(x)dx,
and
Ω2,k(t) =


∫ t
t1
λs(x)dx if k = 1,
1
m−1
(
(m− k)
∫ t
tk
λs(x)dx+
∑k−1
i=1
∫ t−tk−i
tk−tk−i
λs(x)dx
)
if 2 ≤ k ≤ m− 1,
1
m−1
∑m−1
i=1
∫ t−tk−i
tk−tk−i
λs(x)dx if k ≥ m.
Again, hc(x) is the hazard function of VC1. The first term in the CRIF of the system corresponds
to VC1, which is (virtually) replaced on failure and the second term corresponds to the virtual
sub-system (VSS) (the remainder of the system).
The interpretation of Eq. (6) is that the VC in socket 1 is replaced with a new identical VC
10
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whenever it fails or the VSS fails, whichever occurs first.
On the VSS, we make the following remarks.
• For t < t1, the intensity function of the VSS is denoted by λs(t), and the m− 1 VCs in the
VSS are assumed to be identical and the intensity function of each VC is 1
m−1
∫ t
t1
λs(x)dx.
• After the first failure of the system, the VC in socket 1 is renewed and its CHF becomes
Ω1,1(t) =
∫ t−t1
0 hc(x)dx; the VSS has operated t1 time units and hence its CRIF becomes∫ t
t1
λs(x)dx.
• After k failures (2 ≤ k ≤ m − 1) have occurred, in addition to the component that has
been renewed, at most k − 1 VCs have been replaced since time zero. This implies that at
least m − k VCs have not been replaced and the CRIF of the virtual subsystem consisting
of the m − k VCs at time t is m−k
m−1
∫ t
tk
λs(x)dx. The exact replacement history of the other
k − 1 VCs, however, is unknown, hence one may assume that VCi was installed at time tk−i
(i = 1, 2, ..., k − 1). The CRIF at time t of the virtual sub-system consisting of those k − 1
VCs is 1
m−1
∑k−1
i=1
∫ t−tk−i
tk−tk−i
λs(x)dx.
• For k ≥ m, after k failures, the CRIF at time t of the m − 1 virtual components is∫ t−tk−i
tk−tk−i
λs(x)dx, i = 1, . . . , m− 1.
It can be seen from the above discussion that
• if the VC in socket 1 fails, a new identical VC will replace it and the oldest VC in the VSS
will be renewed. No other maintenance is carried out on the other VCs in the VSS;
• if the VSS fails, the same action will be taken as when the VC in socket 1 fails. The VC in
socket 1 is renewed whenever the system (which can be real or virtual) fails. The oldest VC
in the VSS is replaced every k − 1 failures for 2 ≤ k ≤ m− 1 and is replaced every m− 1
failures for k ≥ m, as
• On failure of the system, VC1 is replaced (renewed) and the oldest VC in the VSS is assumed
to be the one replaced at the previous failure. In this way, each VC in the VSS is replaced
every m− 1 failures for k ≥ m.
The system and virtual system are schematically illustrated in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. The system and its corresponding virtual system in Model II.
11
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
The replacement of VCs in the VS is best illustrated by an example. In Figure 3, we show
four failure times t1, t2, t3, t4 in a 3 component system. Then the virtual system is composed
of a VC and a VSS with two VCs. The three elements in the vector are the ages of the VCs
immediately after replacement on failure. The first element in the vector corresponds to VC1
in the virtual system; the second and the third elements in the vector correspond to the two
VCs in the VSS.
• At time t1, VC1 is replaced, VC2 and VC3 remain unchanged
• At time t2, VC1 is replaced. VC2 is assumed to be replaced at time t1, VC3 remains un-
changed;
• At time t3, VC1 is replaced. VC2 remains unchanged, VC3 is assumed to be replaced at time
t2; and
• At time t4, VC1 is replaced. VC2 is assumed to be replaced at time t3, VC3 remains un-
changed.
Fig. 3. Failures of the virtual system corresponding a 3-component series system in Model II, showing
the ages of the VCs immediately after successive system repairs.
3.3 Some properties
Let {Xk : k ≥ 1} be a sequence of nonnegative real-valued random variables with cdf Fk(t)
that have finite mean E[Xk]. To avoid trivialities, we assume that P (Xk > 0) > 0. Let
Sn ≡
n∑
k=1
Xk, n ≥ 1, (7)
with S0 ≡ 0 and
N(t) ≡ max{n ≥ 0 : Sn ≤ t}, t ≥ 0. (8)
Let Fk(t) = 1− e
−Ω1,k(t)−Ω2,k(t) and Xk follow cdf Fk(t).
Denote E[Nc(t)] as the renewal function corresponding to the renewal process with the life-
time distribution 1− e−
∫ t
0
hc(x)dx.
Lemma 1 The expected cumulative number of failures in time interval (0, t] of the stochastic
process defined in Model I, denoted by E[NI(t)], satisfies
max{E[Nc(t)],
∫ t
0
λs(x)dx} ≤ E[NI(t)] ≤ E[Nc(t)] +
∫ t
0
λs(x)dx (9)
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Proof. The system fails if either VC1 or VC2 fails. This implies the following two points.
• It is known that the reliability of a series system is smaller than the reliability of the weakest
component in the system. Hence, the expected number of failures of the system up to time t
is greater than the expected number of failures of the weakest component up to time t. This
proves the first inequality in Lemma (1).
• The expected number of failures of the system up to time t is smaller than the sum of the
expected number of failures of VC1 and that of VC2 up to time t. This proves the second
inequality in Lemma (1).
This proves Lemma 1 
Lemma 1 holds as the VC in socket 1 in Model I is replaced with a new identical VC whenever
it fails or the virtual system fails.
Lemma 2 If λs(x) is increasing in x, and hc(x) and λs(x) in Model I are the same as those in
Model II, respectively, then the expected cumulative number of failures by time t of the stochastic
process defined in Model II, denoted by E[NII(t)], satisfies
E[NII(t)] ≤ E[NI(t)]. (10)
Proof. Note that the system in Model I is composed of VC1 and VC2, and the system in
Model II is composed of VC1 and the VSS. The two VC1s in the two systems have the same
hazard function, which implies that the expected numbers of failures of these two VCs in (0, t]
are equal.
On the other hand, since λs(x) is increasing in x, i.e.,
∫ t−tk−i
tk−tk−i
λs(x)dx <
∫ t
tk
λs(x)dx, it implies
that 1
m−1
(
(m− k)
∫ t
tk
λs(x)dx+
∑k−1
i=1
∫ t−tk−i
tk−tk−i
λs(x)dx
)
<
∫ t
tk
λs(x)dx. That is, Ω2,k(t) in Model
II is smaller than Ω2,k(t) in Model I. Hence, the expected number of failures up to time t of the
VSS in the system associated with Model II is smaller than the expected number of failures up
to time t of VC2 in the system associated with Model I.
Considering both systems are series systems, we have E[NII(t)] ≤ E[NI(t)].
This proves Lemma 2 
Lemmas 1 and 2 provide bounds on the expected number of replacements under Model I and
Model II. This has practical implications for lifecycle costing, for example.
Remark 2 • Replacement occurs in socket 1 of the virtual system in both Model I and Model
II whenever the system fails, even if the VC in the socket does not fail. Hence, the sequence
of failures occurring at socket 1 cannot be considered a renewal process.
• Model II has three cases with different forms of CRIF: in the third case when k ≥ m,
13
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the term Ω2,k(t) =
1
m−1
∑m−1
i=1
∫ t−tk−i
tk−tk−i
λs(x)dx can model a state closer to equilibrium than
the state in the second and first case with CRIF=
∫ t
t1
λs(x)dx and the state with CRIF=
1
m−1
(
(m− k)
∫ t
tk
λs(x)dx +
∑k−1
i=1
∫ t−tk−i
tk−tk−i
λs(x)dx
)
. This is a useful property of Model II,
since Drenick (1960) states that the failure process of a large series system “always tends
toward (statistical) equilibrium as the time of operation becomes very large”, which implies
that such a failure process has two states: a transient state and an equilibrium state, as inter-
preted by Meeker and Escobar (1998). Model I cannot model a failure process with two such
states.
• It should be noted that the second term Ω2,k(t) in Model II (see the quantity (6)) differs
from the arithmetic reduction of intensity models proposed by Doyen and Gaudoin (2004).
The three ARI models, which are ARI∞, ARI1 and ARIm, can be re-written as λ(t) −
g(tN(t), tN(t)−1, ..., t1), where g(.) is a function of (tN(t), tN(t)−1, ..., t1). Their corresponding
CRIFs are
∫ t
tk
(λ(x) − g(tN(t), tN(t)−1, ..., t1))dx, in which the upper limit of the integral is t,
which is different from Ω2,k(t). In essence, the ARI models are developed for a one-component
system that is assumed to start operation at t = 0. However, Ω2,k(t) in Model II is for a multi-
component system, in which the components start operating at different time points.
Remark 3 When the number of components in Model II is not specified, one can fit Model II
when assuming m = 2, 3, . . . and then choose m so that some model selection criterion (e.g.
AIC) is optimised.
4 Parameter estimation
Consider M independent systems of the same kind (replicates), each of which consists of
m non-repairable components with hazard functions hi(t) for i = 1, . . . , m. Suppose that Mj
failures of system j are observed at times tj,1, tj,2, . . . , tj,Mj (where j = 1, 2, ...,M), respectively.
Denote xj,1 = tj,1 and xj,k = tj,k − tj,k−1 for k ≥ 2 and all j.
As discussed above, for both Model I and Model II, we suppose (a) upon system failure,
VC1 in both Model I or Model II is always renewed, and (b) upon system failure, VC2 in
Model I follows an NHPP. For a given system j, immediately after the kth failure, the time-
to-failure distribution is Fkj(t) = 1 − R1,jk(t)R2,jk(t) with R1,jk(t) = exp(−
∫ t−tj,k
0 hc(x)dx)
and R2,jk(t) = exp(−
∫ t
tj,k
λs(x)dx). Then the likelihood function is fj0(t)
∏Mj−1
k=1 fjk(t), where
fj0(t) = (hc(xj,1) +λs(xj,1)) exp
(
−
∫ xj,1
0 hc(x)dx−
∫ xj,1
0 λs(x)dx
)
. Similarly, the likelihood func-
tion for Model II can be developed. The reader is referred to Andersen, Borgan, Gill, and
Keiding (1993) for methods of statistical inference for counting processes. We then obtain the
following.
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Model I. The likelihood for Model I is
LI =
M∏
j=1
{
(hc(xj,1) + λs(xj,1)) exp
(
−
∫ xj,1
0
hc(x)dx−
∫ xj,1
0
λs(x)dx
)
×
Mj−1∏
k=1
(hc(xj,k+1) + λs(tj,k+1)) exp
(
−
∫ xj,k+1
0
hc(x)dx−
∫ tj,k+1
tj,k
λs(x)dx
)
 . (11)
Model-II. The likelihood for Model II is
LII =
M∏
j=1
{[
(hc(xj,1) + λs(xj,1)) exp
(
−
∫ xj,1
0
hc(x)dx−
∫ tj,1
0
λs(x)dx
)]
×
[
(hc(xj,2) + λs(tj,2)) exp
(
−
∫ xj,2
0
hc(x)dx−
∫ tj,2
tj,1
λs(x)dx
)]
×
m−1∏
k=2
[(
hc(xj,k+1) +
1
m− 1
((m− k)λs(tj,k+1) +
k−1∑
i=1
λs(tj,k+1 − tj,k−i))
)
×
exp
(
−
∫ xj,k+1
0
hc(x)dx−
1
m− 1
(
(m− k)
∫ tj,k+1
tj,k
λs(x)dx+
k−1∑
i=1
∫ tj,k+1−tj,k−i
tj,k−tj,k−i
λs(x)dx
))]
×
Mj−1∏
k=m
[
(hc(xj,k+1) +
1
m− 1
m−1∑
i=1
λs(tj,k+1 − tj,k−i))×
exp
(
−
∫ xj,k+1
0
hc(x)dx−
m−1∑
i=1
∫ tj,k+1−tj,k−i
tj,k−tj,k−i
λs(x)dx
)]}
. (12)
One can then obtain the parameters in Model I and Model II via maximising the logarithm
of LI and the logarithm of LII, respectively.
5 Numerical examples
5.1 Simulation study
In this subsection, we fit Models I and II, and four other models (RP, NHPP, GP, and GRP)
to artificially generated datasets, and then compare the AIC values of these models. It is known
that the renewal process (RP) is usually used for perfect repair scenarios, the non-homogeneous
Poisson process with power law intensity function (NHPP-PL) is often used for minimal repair,
and two models for imperfect repair: the geometric process (GP) and the generalised renewal
process with Vk = Vk−1 + qXk being the virtual age after the kth failure (GRP) are used for
imperfect repair. When Model I is used, the number m of components in the system is not
specified.
The following steps are followed to compare the performance of the models.
(1) We consider three cases m = 5, 10, 15 for the number of sockets in the system.
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(2) The time to failure of each component follows a Weibull distribution 1 − e−(
t
α)
β
, where
the shape parameter β and the scale parameter α are randomly selected from the uniform
distribution on the intervals (0.5, 4) and (12, 60), respectively.
(3) If a component fails, a new identical component with the same α and β as the failed one
replaces the failed component.
(4) In each case we use 10 replicates of each system so that M = 10.
(5) We use the values 15, 20 for Mj , the number of failures observed for each replicate.
(6) Using the randomly generated data implied by the above, we fit each of the 6 models:
the RP, the GP, the GRP, the NHPP-PL, Model I, and Model II, by maximising their
respective log-likelihoods. For Model I and Model II the likelihoods are given by Eqs (11)
and (12). The reader is referred to Lam (2007) for the likelihoods of the RP, the GP and
the NHPP-PL, respectively, and to Yanez, Joglar, and Modarres (2002) for the likelihood
of the GRP. In the RP, the GP, and the GRP, it is assumed that time to first failure
is a Weibull distribution 1 − e
−
(
t
α1
)β1
. In the NHPP-PL model,
(
t
α1
)β1−1
is the CRIF of
the series system. In both Model I and Model II, we assume that hc(t) =
β1
α1
( t
α1
)β1−1 and
λs(t) =
β2
α2
( t
α2
)β2−1.
(7) Then we calculate the AIC (Akaike information criterion) value for each model:
AIC = 2p− 2 ln(L), (13)
where L is the maximized value of the log-likelihood for the model, p is the number of
parameters in the model. The term 2p in the AIC penalises a model with a large number
of parameters. The values of p of the six models are shown in Table 1. Note, Model I and
Model II with p = 4 incur the highest penalty on their AIC values.
Table 1
The number of parameters p for each model.
RP GP NHPP-PL GRP Model I Model II
p 2 3 2 3 4 4
With Mj = 15 andMj = 20 and m = 5, 10, 15 there are 6 combinations. We repeat the above
steps (1) to (7) for each of 30 repetitions, in each of which the values of α and β are different.
Calculations are done with a statistical package R (which can be downloaded from www.r-
project.org/). Table 2 shows the mean values and the variances (that are shown in the brackets
under means) of the AIC values of the models over the 30 repetition for each combination.
On the 30 repetitions of each of the 6 combinations, we then use a paired t-test at the 5
percent level to compare the AIC values of Model I and Model II with each of the other four
models, respectively. The results are shown in Table 3, which includes 48 comparisons in total.
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In the table, symbol ‘X’ represents the result that the hypothesis test fails to reject the null
hypothesis that the AIC value of Model I (or Model II) is smaller than that of its comparison
model, and symbol ‘×’ represents the result that the hypothesis test rejects the null hypothesis.
From the table, we make the following observations.
• On all the comparisons, both Model I and Model II have smaller AIC values than those of
the RP and the GP.
• On the performance of Model I. In only 8 out of 24 comparisons does the hypothesis test
reject the null hypothesis that the AIC value of Model I is smaller than that of the NHPP-PL
or that of the GRP. Thus, in the remaining 16 of the 24 comparisons the test fails to reject
the null hypothesis.
• On the performance of Model II. In all the comparisons the test fails to reject the null
hypothesis. That is, in all the comparisons, Model II outperforms the other models.
• Comparing the AIC values of Model I and Model II, it can be seen that Model II outperforms
Model I.
Table 2
The mean values of AIC from 30 repetitions, for various values of the number of replicates, M , number
of failures Mj of each replicate, and number of components m in each replicate of the system.
AIC values
M Mj m RP GP NHPP-PL GRP Model I Model II
5
855.73 856.42 856.48 853.53 851.81 840.95
(77.25) (74.92) (73.45) (75.20) (75.33) (74.83)
15 10
670.60 672.39 663.45 663.22 662.98 659.31
(50.69) (50.68) (48.25) (48.13) (47.91) (47.88)
15
562.87 564.77 553.70 554.04 553.75 551.34
(36.72) (36.79) (34.74) (35.33) (35.18) (34.96)
10
5
1126.03 1125.65 1125.50 1121.52 1119.72 1109.49
(107.52) (103.85) (102.58) (105.03) (104.70) (105.42)
20 10
877.23 877.36 868.31 867.82 867.69 862.78
(68.15) (65.43) (64.89) (64.72) (64.32) (65.03)
15
711.76 711.08 699.44 700.16 700.09 695.76
(57.32) (58.90) (57.95) (57.82) (58.04) (57.09)
To consider further the performance of Model I and Model II, we investigate the caseM = 10,
Mj = 15, and m = 5 in more detail. The results are shown in Table 4. As can be seen from this
table, the AIC values of the GRP are smaller than those of the NHPP-PL on most repetitions
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Table 3
Comparison of the AIC values of the six models based on the paired t-tests (at 5 percent level).
Is Model I’s AIC value smaller than that of Is Model II’s AIC value smaller than that of
M Mj m RP? GP? NHPP-PL? GRP? RP? GP? NHPP-PL? GRP?
5 X X X X X X X X
15 10 X X × × X X X X
15 X X × × X X X X
10 5 X X X X X X X X
20 10 X X × × X X X X
15 X X × × X X X X
(precisely, on 23 repetitions). We therefore compare the AIC values of Model I and Model II
with the AIC of the GRP. Based on Table 4, we plot Figure 4 that shows the differences between
the AIC values of the GRP and those of Model I (i.e., the solid line), and the differences between
the AIC values of the GRP and Model II (i.e., the dashed line) on the 30 repetitions. From the
figure, we make the following observations
• All the AIC differences between the GRP and Model II are positive. Thus Model II performs
better than the GRP on all 30 repetitions. The largest two AIC differences are greater than
24 (i.e, the values corresponding 9 and 30 on the X-axis).
• When the AIC differences between the GRP and Model I are compared, on 10 of 30 repetitions
the AIC values of the GRP are greater than that of Model I. The largest AIC difference is
greater than 15 (i.e, the value corresponding 9 on the X-axis).
Furthermore, to allow the reader who may be interested to validate the results by repeating
the experiment, we record model parameters generated in one of the 30 repetitions from the
case in which Mj = 15 and m = 5. Table 5 shows the Weibull distribution parameters used
to generate the time between failures in this repetition. With these parameters, the random
lifetimes of the components in a system (here M = 1) are generated (Table 6). Table 7 shows
the estimated parameters and AIC for the six models. It can be seen that (1) in Model I, β2 is
smaller than 1, which implies that the hazard function λs(t) of VC2 in Model I decreases over
time, (2) the AIC values of Model I and Model II are the smallest among the six models, and
(3) the values of α1 and β1 in the RP and the GP are the same and the values of α1 and β1
in the NHPP-PL and the GRP are the same. Hence, the GP and the GRP will not be further
analysed. Figure 5 shows the CIFs of the other four models and the empirical CIF (i.e., the
cumulative number of failures) generated from the data shown in Table 6. From the figure, we
can see that Model I and Model II fit the empirical CIF well and the RP has the worst fit,
which confirms its large AIC value shown in Table 7.
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Table 4
Estimated AIC values of the six models for each individual repetition for the case when M = 10,
Mj = 15 and m = 5, corresponding to the first row (with the m value underlined) in Table 2.
repetition RP GP NHPP-PL GRP Model I Model II repetition RP GP NHPP-PL GRP Model I Model II
1 779.35 779.77 779.30 775.36 771.82 765.41 16 979.41 981.35 974.07 972.86 978.07 961.13
2 760.67 762.01 762.60 760.15 757.16 743.85 17 865.21 866.93 866.02 863.35 864.37 849.03
3 927.23 928.67 925.81 924.50 923.12 917.20 18 947.38 949.31 946.13 946.58 948.49 934.47
4 818.35 820.30 820.40 819.94 816.98 800.98 19 750.29 752.26 750.74 748.28 748.41 732.82
5 888.91 890.05 891.50 885.54 887.90 880.61 20 845.51 847.50 854.76 844.79 838.28 833.61
6 781.63 783.36 800.80 783.49 783.01 773.31 21 911.38 912.37 915.41 910.11 909.89 893.32
7 921.32 922.94 914.74 916.74 914.38 906.13 22 845.37 846.10 842.61 841.98 835.94 829.25
8 829.80 830.55 834.07 826.89 820.26 808.77 23 697.75 698.90 695.11 694.05 693.98 684.63
9 1004.75 982.86 965.87 976.12 960.30 944.94 24 808.40 810.02 813.92 809.28 803.59 801.11
10 866.31 866.35 873.63 866.88 862.58 858.14 25 867.02 868.87 870.00 866.54 862.72 847.86
11 788.51 789.78 790.82 788.76 790.61 772.71 26 923.48 925.06 922.86 924.50 926.69 922.81
12 767.24 768.95 776.46 769.24 770.09 766.81 27 729.82 730.96 729.32 727.85 725.40 716.88
13 902.65 904.55 911.43 903.90 903.53 902.94 28 954.91 956.90 954.95 956.78 958.16 943.80
14 936.27 938.12 929.67 930.86 929.84 917.80 29 881.00 883.00 881.11 878.75 876.43 861.49
15 839.34 841.20 840.10 841.34 841.82 832.72 30 852.60 853.68 860.35 850.59 850.53 823.91
Fig. 4. The difference in the AIC values between Model I and GRP, and the difference in the AIC
values between Model II and GRP, based on the data shown in Table 4.
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Table 5
The parameters of the Weibull distributions of the 5 components used to generate failures in e the
case Mj = 15 and m = 5.
α β α β α β α β α β
26.725 2.276 53.900 2.893 48.890 3.571 33.008 2.981 35.435 0.846
Table 6
15 observations generated using the parameters in Table 5.
8.173 3.707 2.107 14.989 2.279 4.354 5.612 8.165 7.718 0.736 7.822 11.078 9.389 3.640 10.929
Table 7
Results for the models fitted to the simulated times between failures given in Table 6.
Estimated Parameters
RP GP NHPP-PL GRP Model I Model II
αˆ = 26.286 aˆ = 1.000 αˆ = 8.374 qˆ = 1.0001 αˆ1 = 10.105, βˆ1 = 2.764 αˆ1 = 11.072, βˆ1 = 3.144
βˆ = 0.829 αˆ = 26.286, βˆ = 0.829 βˆ = 1.0889 αˆ = 8.374, βˆ = 1.0889 αˆ2 = 15.213, βˆ2 = 0.961 αˆ2 = 20.429, βˆ2 = 1.905
AIC=108.941 AIC=110.941 AIC=91.018 AIC=93.017 AIC=89.093 AIC=88.161
Fig. 5. The cumulative number of failures (empirical) and the CIFs for the models fitted to the
simulated times between failures given in Table 6.
5.2 A real dataset
In this subsection we compare the models when fitted to a dataset (TBF-7913) published in
Proschan (1963). The data are the 27 observations of times-between-failure of an air condition-
ing unit in an aircraft.
Since the number of components in the system is not given specified, following Remark 3,
we simply compare the AIC values of Model II when the number of components is assumed to
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be 2, 3, ..., and 10. The minimum AIC value is achieved when the number of components is 3.
The parameters and the AIC values of the models are listed in Table 8, from which we can see
that Model II outperforms other models.
Table 8
Results for the models fitted to the air conditioner data TBF-7913.
Estimated Parameters
RP GP NHPP-PL GRP Model I Model II
αˆ = 79.924 aˆ = 0.971 αˆ = 73.739 qˆ = 0.0000001 αˆ1 = 219.978, βˆ1 = 2.988 αˆ1 = 176.503, βˆ1 = 1.897
βˆ = 1.123 αˆ = 54.917, βˆ = 1.148 βˆ = 0.988 αˆ = 49.438, βˆ = 1.123 αˆ2 = 93.558, βˆ2 = 1.00855 αˆ2 = 77.406, βˆ2 = 0.875
AIC=293.913 AIC=292.202 AIC=292.431 AIC=293.913 AIC=294.578 AIC=290.842
6 Conclusions
This paper develops two stochastic models of the failure process of a multi-component series
system. Model I is designed for the case when the number of components in a system is not
specified. It regards the failure process of the system equivalent to that of a virtual system
consisting of two sockets into each of which there is inserted a virtual component. Whenever
the system fails, replacement occurs at socket 1 and minimal repair or no maintenance is
conducted on the virtual component in socket 2. Model II regards the failure process of the
system equivalent to that of a virtual system consisting of a socket and a subsystem. The
socket contains one virtual component and the subsystem contains m − 1 sockets into each of
which there is inserted virtual components. Broadly speaking, whenever the virtual system fails,
replacement occurs at socket 1 and the oldest virtual component in the subsystem is replaced
virtual subsystem is imperfectly repaired.
The performance of the two models is compared with four well-known models on the basis
of six artificially generated datasets. The results show that (1) overall Model I outperforms the
renewal process and the geometric process on the simulated data and (2) Model II outperforms
the four models on the simulated data and on the real data. Model II performs better than
Model I. Furthermore, when fitted to a real-world dataset, Model II is again the best performing
model of the six.
The models quantify the notion that the repair effect must be at least as big as if the most
reliable component were replaced, and therefore the models consider a repair effect through
component replacement rather than through the parameterization of maintenance effectiveness.
In a further applied study, we intend to fit the models to a large number of real datasets, and
handle the case of right censoring in the likelihood estimation of the models. Finally, we make
the point that methods that do not make parametric assumptions about the hazard function
hc(x) and the intensity function λs(x) are appealing in many settings, and our future work may
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consider the development of non-parametric versions of Models I and Model II.
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